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~ Introduction
Seven years after passing Massachusetts General Law Chap~er 21E (the
Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Materials Release Preveition and Response
Act of 1983), the Commonwealth, once again, is deliberating further changes
to this already modified law. The Massachusetts State Superfund program
has made great progress, however, uncertainty about the hkalth risks,
environmental effects, and economic impacts that surround the law still
exist. With the benefit of additional information about hazardous waste and
its effects, the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (DEP)
hopes to further strengthen and support the law's intentions.
Today, determining the number of hazardous sites and the extent of
contamination is clearer, but there are still many questions and debates on
how to strengthen the existing program. How can sites be prioritized? Can
site dean-up goals be established more quickly? How should risk assessment
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be used? What are the impacts on the state budget and economy?
Because of the large funding issues regarding 21E, little emphasis has been
placed on the questions which might address areas such Js research and
development, new more efficient clean-up technologies, and adequately
trained technical personnel to refine the fledgling program, This study
concentrates on what can be learned from the effects of Je first years of the
21E program. •
Background
The goal of our project was to assess the adequacy of the existing state
Superfund law and the statutory remedies that ·Massach~setts relies on to .
recover "" costs associated with the clean up of oil and hazardous materials
l
r:lbe~l~dmto the environment. Initially, the major focuses of our study were
ia 1 Ity and ec "
. . onorruc Issues that result from the state laws and regulations
associated WIth hazardous waste site remediation. Our specific stud
were locally-significant businesses in rural western M h .yareas
assac usetts Involved
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in the 21E process. Throughout our study we interviewed experts in the field
and all of the different players in the 21E process.
During the first half of our study we searched for evidence showing that the
Massachusetts Superfund law does not provide adequate liability provisions
for the innocent purchaser and lender (buyers and lenders who had no part in
the contamination process) relating to clean-up costs. Our research showed,
however, that the law does provide adequate liability provisions for the
innocent landowner, which we will discuss later. As for the innocent lender,
the United States Supreme Court will soon be deciding the ''Fleet Factors"
case which may eliminate banks from the liability "loop." ~(The
Massachusetts Superfund law is modelled after the feder~: Superfund law,
therefore any changes in the federal law may also be reflected in the
Massachusetts law.) !
Because of our initial findings, we redirected the focus of ,! ur inquiry and
examined the problems within the law that detract from program
effectiveness and efficiency. In the second half of our stuJy, we evaluated
case studies to expose the problems inherent in the 21E process. A brief
description of the more revealing case studies we investigated can be found in
Appendix A. I~
I
Through studying the cases, we determined that the underlying problem
within 21E is the constant confrontation between the players necessary to
carry out the process. Opposing values, interests and motivations have
historically created a difficult atmosphere for effective management and
implementation of the program. I
One of the causes of this confrontation problem is the lack of strict standards
for risk assessment. With a multitude of views on the effects and risks to the
public health and the environment, cleanup costs are a Bone of contention
that often delay the clean up of a site for years. This sterns from the lack of
I . ~
~ ear envtronmemajjy - based program priorities and has compromised the
mtent of the law. Before addressing this problem and others, we examined
the history of the federal and state Superfund laws. l .
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The History of Superfund
The United States produces more than 260 million metric tons of hazardous
waste per year. Approximately two-thirds of all this waste is disposed of
directly into pits, ponds and landfills. All of these disposal methods are
subject to leaks which can contaminate ground water. Another 22 percent of
hazardous waste is discharged directly into surface waters.
In 1987, in the first report of its kind, the U. S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) released a study that showed that 550 million pounds of toxic
substances were dumped into the nation's waters. Of this amount, it was
determined that 10.5 million pounds were carcinogenic compounds. In 1983,
the U.S. Department of Commerce estimated that Massachusetts alone had
generated close to one metric ton of hazardous waste per person. Since it only
takes one quart of gasoline or oil to contaminate several million gallons of
drinking water, the severity of the nation's hazardous waste problems are
obvious.
I
As a result of earlier and similar findings, the Resource 9onservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976 was enacted to manage the !amounts of newly
generated hazardous wastes. Not long after the passage J this legislation, it
became apparent that a separate federal program was needed to manage the
cleanup of previously contaminated or uncontrolled haz~rdous waste sites.
In 1980, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA) was established. It was the respo~sibility of the
CERCLA's Superfund program to handle emergencies at hmcontrolled sites,
clean up these sites and manage any other related problems.
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At the time of enactment, the extent and scope of the problems that the
CERCLA program would be facing at these uncontrolled sites was not clear.
There was little scientific and comprehensive understanding of the risks
associated with hazardous releases, especially with the long-term effects. As a
result, Congress limited the scope of the Superfund program by directing the
EP~ to set up a Hazard Ranking System to obtain a numerical rating for sites
National Priority List (NPL). A site had to be listed on the NPL before it could
be considered for any site remediation. The Superfund program was directed
to list at least 400 sites on the NPL which needed remedial cleanup. In spite of
the controversy over the amount needed to support the Superfund program,
Congress limited the program to $1.6 billion over 5 years.
Due to the limited nature of the Federal Superfund program, some states
have enacted their own State Superfund program to deal with the smaller
and more numerous uncontrolled hazardous waste sites within their state
lines. One such state is Massachusetts. We briefly examined a similar law in
Connecticut for comparison. We soon discovered that the Connecticut law is
not as well-defined as the Massachusetts law.
Massachusetts General Law Chapter 21E
On March 24, 1983 the Massachusetts Legislature approved M. G. 1. Chapter
21E. There have been seven major changes to 21E since its enactment which
have further strengthened the law's regulatory provisions:
• Section 3 - "Authorized and directed" the DEP to prepare the
Massachusetts Contingency Plan (MCP)
• Section 3A - The 1986 Ballot Question 4 Amendment I
• Section 4 - Response Actions to be taken by DEP or Potentially Responsible
Party (PRP)
• Section 5 - Persons Liable; "Innocent Owner" Language
• Section 7 - Notification Process of Release by Liable Parties
• Section 11 - Penalties for Noncompliance
• Section 13 - Cost Recovery through Liens and "Superlien"
The Massachusetts Contingency Plan (MCP)
The MCP was referred to in the 1983 Chapter 21E legislation, however, it was
not filed with the Secretary of State until May 13, 1988. The MCP is a set of
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regulations which establish requirements and procedures for identifying,
evaluating and cleaning up releases of oil or hazardous materials. These
matters had been previously governed by the general provisions of 21E.
The MCP put forth regulations that detailed the comprehensive process
necessary for addressing contaminated propex:ty. Directed primarily at historic
contamination, the MCP begins the process with notification requirements,
then proceeds to placement of the site on a list and then through a number of
phases of investigation and remedial response actions. All of these aspects
are described in brief below.
Site Investigation and the Remediation Process
Notification Requirements
The MCP explains in detail how to report to DEP when a release of oil or
other hazardous substance is discovered. The notification rules apply to any
"release or threat of release" which occurs after August 31, 1988. Pre-existing
contamination is also governed by Chapter 21E. For new and potential
releases, the MCP states that any person who is liable under Chapter 21E is
held responsible to notify DEP "as soon as possible but not more than two
hours after obtaining knowledge of a release or threats of release to the
environment ... unless the person responsible for notifying persuades the
-.Department that extenuating circumstances prevented such notification."
The penalties for failing to report are substantial fines and/or imprisonment.
The notification regulations define how to determine whether or not the
substance released is oil or a hazardous material. The rules also define
reportable quantities of oil or hazardous materials, the release of which
determines the reporting obligation. The MCP states that the notification
rules do not only apply to an accidental spill but also to a continuous or
intermittent release.
7
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Site Listing
Most places where there is either an oil or a hazardous substance release is
called a "disposal site." These sites are subject to the MCP requirements and
regulations. DEP maintains four classification lists of disposal sites:
• Locations To Be Investigated (LTBI) - locations which DEP considers likely
to be disposal sites;
• Confirmed Disposal Sites;
• Remedial Sites - sites which have been cleaned up to DEP's approval; and
• Deleted Sites - sites which for one reason or another no longer need
remediation.
Site Assessment and Remedial Response
The MCP dictates five stages of remedial response actions that the Potentially
Responsible Party must go through. These stages go from the initial
assessment of site contamination to the final cleanup and monitoring of the
site. Deadlines are imposed which should assure the completion of DEP
criteria at different stages in the process. Failure to meet a deadline is in
violation of the Mep and threatens civil and administrative penalties.
1) Preliminary Assessment (PA):
The PAis the initial evaluation of a site which determines whether it is a
disposal location, whether any immediate clean-up measures need to be
taken or whether further remedial response actions need to occur. The PA
must be completed one year from the initial listing of the site on the LTBI or
Disposal list.
2) Phase One - Limited Site Investigation:
Phase one investigation confirms that the location is a disposal site. It
provides ~nf~rma:ion to DEP so that it can classify the site as either a priority
or no~-pnontJ:' disposal site. This classification determines the degree of
attentlO~ the SIte receives from DEP and the ability of the Potentially
Responslble Party to bypass certain DEP requirements through a waiver.
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Classification as a priority site results in the site being placed on a fast-track
cleanup schedule and it may also trigger public involvement requirements.
3) Phase Two - Comprehensive Site Assessment:
The Comprehensive Site Assessment is just what its name implies, a
comprehensive investigation and assessment of the environmental risks and
problems at the site. This phase determines the extent and nature of the
contamination, determines the type and quantity of oil or hazardous
substance and characterizes and evaluates the risk to the public and
environment presented by the site. A phase two report must be presented to
the DEP for approval
One of the most significant aspects of this phase is the risk characterization
provision. The MCP requires that the level of contamination at the site be
compared to nationally-recognized standards. It also may require a process
that attempts to scientifically and numerically determine the health risks
posed by the site. If the level of contamination exceeds the national clean-up
standards, the site must be cleaned up accordingly. An exception would be if
the levels of contamination that exist at the site after removal of the disposal
site's contaminants still exceed the pertinent national standards. In this case,
DEP may approve a remediation process that cleans the site only to the
background levels.
There is no deadline for completion of this phase, however, there is a
deadline for implementing the chosen remedy which drives this time frame.
4) Phase Three - Development of Remedial Response Alternatives and the
Final Remedial Response Plan:
After completion of Phase Two, the PRP must develop a number of
alternatives for site remediation, evaluate their feasibility and recommend
one for ~pproval by DEP. The MCP specifies different categories of
alternatives that fall under on-site treatment, off-site treatment on-site. ,
contamment or disposal, off-site disposal and no action. The recommended
response action must be one that meets the clean-up standards identified in
Phase Two.
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~ A Phase Three report, which includes the proposed remedy, must be
submitted to the DEP for approval. It may be submitted concurrently with the
Phase Two report with prior permission from the DEP.
5) Phase Four - Implementation of Approved Remedial Response
Alternative:
Phase Four involves three activities: the development of a Remedial
Response Implementation Plan; the construction, initial operation and
maintenance of the proposed remedy; and the preparation of the final
inspection report upon construction completion. Both the plan and the
report must be submitted to the DEP for approval.
The MCP requires that priority disposal sites have a permanent or temporary
solution implemented within four years of initial listing as an LTBI. Non-
priority disposal sites must have a Final Remedial Response Plan completed
within seven years. Once there is satisfactory completion of Phase Four
activities, DEP determines that the work has been completed and approves
the final inspection report.
Short-Term Measures:
The MCP states that when and if situations arise that pose an immediate
threat to human health or the environment, an immediate response is
required in the form of "Short-Term Measures." A Short-Term Measure is
not subject to the lengthy requirements described above, although once
completed it must go through the remaining phases of remedial response.
DEP approval must be obtained before initiating a Short-Term Measure.
Summary
The Massachusetts Contingency Plan is notable in its thoroughness and detail
in addressing contaminated sites. It is the result of the public's clear mandate
that called for the development of a clean-up process that was consistent,
strict and highly protective of the public health and environment. A number
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,..-.." of states have extended the Federal Superfund concept to cover real estate
transactions but Massachusetts is the one state that has taken the lead in this
type of regulation. It is almost certain that Massachusetts' regulatory
initiatives will be followed and adopted by other states.
As shown by the chart in Appendix B, 21E, in spite of its progress, does have
problems. The chart illustrates that there is a backlog of sites in the
Preliminary Assessment stage and in Phase One of the MCP. This backlog
promotes a continued risk to public health and the environment. We
question whether this fact is representative of the law's original priorities and
goals.
This backlog exists primarily due to the lack of commitment from the state to
support this program. There is a lack of funding to support the necessary
personnel, management and technical assistance needed for the program to
succeed. Support for the appropriate work force and clean-up technologies
needs to be developed to promote improvement and expansion in the areas
of research and development, and a better trained work force.
Another area of concern is the governmental management of the program.
The management needs more clarification to improve DEP's consistency with
the statutory requirements. Moreover, the state needs to direct the
determination of what a permanent remedy is, how clean is clean enough,
and where the government's oversight is best focused in the program.
Below is a list of ''bugs in the system" that we discovered during our
assessment of the law's effectiveness in cleaning up hazardous waste sites.
Summary of Systemic 21E Problems
Health and environment are not priority reflected by the following:
- An unaddressed backlog of sites in initial phases.
- Risk assessment is not used to determine priority sites.
~ - There are no established minimum dean-up standards.
- More concern for who is going to pay than getting started with dean up.
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Not enough support to workers in program reflected by the following:
- Weak management, information and technical assistance.
- No long-term government support.
- No technology policy which results in less efficient and less cost-effective
clean ups.
Bureaucracy and weak state management reflected by the following:
- Weak DEP direction and oversight of process.
- Financing and enforcement of liabilities causes delays.
Recommended Short- Term Changes:
We determined the above problem areas to be critical in terms of the 21E
program's effectiveness and efficiency. We divided these stumbling blocks
into three key areas: 1) a need to prioritize the law's goals and objectives; 2) a
need to strengthen the state's cleanup work force; and, 3) a need to improve
the state government's role in management of the program. We have
developed both short-term and long-term remedies to address these
problems. The short-term remedies concentrate on changes within the
existing program that can be installed incrementally and are not as substantial
as the long-term plans. These initiatives include the following:
Set Clean-up Goals and Priorities:
- Set clean-up priorities based on current and future risks of contaminated
sites.
- Establish minimum clean-up standards for the nation.
- Establish definition of permanent cleanup.
Establishing a hazard-ranking system based on present and potential threats
to the health, welfare and environment, is key to the law's intention.
Chapter 21E does address the need to cleanup sites that pose an imminent
threat through the Short Term Measures language. However, once a site has
undergone the containment or cleanup of the imminently threatening
situation, the site's future risks are considered in a limited fashion through
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the placement of the site on a priority or non- priority list. Contaminated
sites should be placed on a hierarchical, highest priority list. Evaluating the
potential of contaminant migration should be one of the key factors for
prioritizing site cleanups. Might the site contaminate a sole supply of
drinking water? What are the possible future uses of the site?
Minimum national clean-up standards will address up many of the conflicts
regarding how clean is clean. The many competing interests will have
minimum clean-up standards to reach which would satisfy the variations
among communities, responsible parties and government officials as to a
site's risks to public health and the environment. Therefore, the.
environmental mitigation of a site will not be hindered by that kind of
conflict of interest. Defining what constitutes a permanent cleanup is another
way to resolve conflicts of interest and will help unclog the Mep pipeline.
Develop Program Workers:
- Establish hierarchy of clean-up technologies and methods.
- Expand DEP/EPA work force.
- Establish a division of DEP/EPA as a clearinghouse for dean-up
technology ideas.
The establishment of a hierarchy of clean-up methods would also reduce
confrontation between PRPs and the State about cleanup costs and which
method is preferred for a specific type of contamination. This remedy can not
stand alone, however. Only through the expansion of the DEP work force
a~d the sup~~rt for research and development within the government will
~hissuggestIon work. With the increase in the number of firms specializing
In hazardous waste, an emergence of new technologies is appearing that the
s.tat.ecan not recognize due to lack of support for this area and because of a
limited work force.
Strengthen Government Management:
- Reexamine financing and enforcement of liability laws.
- ~prove DEP oversight and management of process to improve
envrronrnental performance.
- Commit to permanent program.
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In some instances where a PRP's economic hardship is evident due to
extenuating circumstances, a low-interest loan should be available that will
insure adequate and prompt remediation of the site. As it stands today, again,
the funding for this type of program is extremely limited. The enforcement of
liability under the state Superfund law should be expanded to include
educational resources. This would alleviate some of the burdens of innocent
landowners who otherwise would not know how to proceed under the law to
be fully informed of their rights, and where to go for assistance.
The state's management of the program should be strengthened so that the
direction and oversight of their implementation methods are clearer for all of
those involved. Through national clean-up standards and a definition of
how clean is clean, the DEP can become more consistent in their
interpretations of site risks. There should be little or no conflict between the
cost of a cleanup and the assurance of environmental protection. All of the
above recommendations will not be possible without the commitment of the
federal and state governments to establish a permanent program. Until there
is such a commitment, long-range planning will not be perceived of as a
necessary technique for solving the hazardous waste problems within
Massachusetts and other states.
Proposed Long-Term Changes:
Once the short term initiatives have been developed and implemented, the
next stage of more substantial and long range planning for the 21E program
will be set. The first area of consideration we focused on is, again, in the
development of the law's cleanup priorities and goals.
Set Clean-up Goals and Priorities:
- Limit use of existing ranking system.
- Strengthen cost-effectiveness requirements for remedy selection.
- Integrate community perspective into site decisions (priority sites).
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The use of the existing ranking system within 21E has two objectives. First of
all, it determines if a site should be listed on the contaminated site list or not.
The next determination is whether the site should be listed as a priority or
non-priority location. As mentioned earlier, once a site is decidedly
contaminated it has to follow the stages in the MCP. Priority sites do have
rank in terms of getting the DEP's attention. There is, however, little
distinction between these priority sites in regard to each location's respective
cleanup urgency. Triage is necessary, even among priority sites.
As previously mentioned the cost of site remediation is a very controversial
issue among PRP's and the DEP. Due to the current lack of support for the
21E program, poor funding and inadequate personnel have made it very
difficult for the DEP to keep on top of the new clean-up technologies. Cost-
effective and environmentally-friendly technologies are emerging as options.
Therefore, the cleanup methods made available to PRP's are often
inappropriately costly for the amount and type of contamination. They are
usually not time efficient, either. Cost-effectiveness of a cleanup needs to be
measured against such things as the risks posed by the contamination, the
value of the property and the economics of the entire situation.
One idea to remedy this situation is the incorporation of all the suggested
solutions, looking at the cost of the cleanup versus the use of the site in the
future. If an industrial site is cleaned up to the-standards necessary for an
industrial area, as opposed to the standards necessary for a daycare center, and
the property in question is somehow restricted for specifically that type of use
in the future, this could be more cost-effective and practical for all parties
involved. Extensive consideration to the potential situations that might arise
from this type of restriction would need to be evaluated. This kind of
"performance standard" would need to be taken into account
Develop worker skills and technologies:
- Establish site managers.
- Establish environmental auditors.
- Increase research and development activities.
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A licensed site manager would have operational management responsibility
for a site from the time of its initial site listing to the monitoring of the
completed remediation. The site manager would limit the amount of
overlap and redundancy in the activities that pertain to the site cleanup. The
job of a site manager would become a profession in itself made up of
specialists who understand the workings of the program in its entirety. This
idea for licensed site managers is currently being considered in both
Massachusetts and Connecticut.
Without a program to establish certified environmental auditors, the
consistency of site managers in their management responsibilities might not
be able to be policed as effectively as it should be. Auditors would go from site
to site for on-site investigations as well as do environmental engineering
activities that test their site analysis audits. Criteria for the testing and
certification of auditors would be compiled from the DEP and EPA as well as
with professionals in the fields of engineering, hazardous waste, scientists
and others.
Increasing the funding for research and development would enable the DEP
to become highly knowledgeable about the emerging hazardous waste clean-
up technologies. Working in the area of research and development will also
bring the DEP closer to identifying problems within the law in the area of site
remediation.
Improve Government Management:
- Combine the PA and Phase One.
- Reexamine program deadlines.
- Reduce the need for formal compliance of on-site cleanup.
- Establish evaluation program for completed cleanups and ones in
progress.
- Establish standards for measuring the program's environmental
progress.
- Address conflicts with technology selection.
By combining the preliminary assessment of a site and Phase One of the site
remediation, the MCP could become more streamlined and time efficient.
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-, Since the two phases are very similar in their objectives and results the need
for two phases could be reduced to one. This change might influence the
deadlines of other areas of the site cleanup which triggers the need for
examination of phase completion deadlines. Today the initial phases of the
MCP represent gridlock to the DEP and the PRPs. These areas, in particular,
need careful examination.
Integrating licensed site managers will reduce the existing need for formal
DEP oversight for every step of the MCP process. This will in turn allow the
DEP work force to put their efforts to better use; such as the establishment of
an environmental evaluation program; research and development and;
establishing standards for measuring environmental progress after site
remediation.
Conclusion
These ideas are reflective of the many diverse interests that we encountered
through our investigation of the law. Although it is impossible to
recommend alternatives to the law that will meet the requirements of every
interest, our attempt here is to try, first and foremost, to satisfy the foundation
of what 21E was built on: the cleaning up of sites contaminated with oil and
hazardous waste so that there is little or no risks to public health, welfare or
the environment.
As previously mentioned other cleanup programs do exist but none seem to
offer the stringency that 21E does. If, in the future, Massachusetts does receive
the monetary support needed to implement the changes we have
recommended above, the Commonwealth, apart from its effective program
for cleaning up hazardous waste sites, will also help prevent the inevitable
problem of increasing hazardous waste generation that it and the nation face.
In 1989,Massachusetts took a step in the right direction in an attempt to
further solve the mounting problems associated with the generation of
hazardous waste by passing the Toxic-use Reduction Law. This law mandates
the reduction of the use of toxic chemicals. Not only will this law reduce the
17
~ amount of hazardous waste generated, but it will also illustrate that
industries' costs and benefits associated with hazardous waste will change.
Source reduction will reduce industries' waste disposal, waste storage and
liability costs.
Supporting regulatory approaches to hazardous waste remediation is perhaps
the only resolution to a problem that is affecting every nation across the
globe. Massachusetts has a strong, but controversial regulatory approach.
Chapter 21Eand the new source reduction law are doubly effective in solving
problems associated with hazardous waste. The two laws, in effect,
complement one another and will work given appropriate commitment
through budgetary and management support.
1 8
Appendix A
Site Investigations:
• Century Brass, New Milford, CT
• Hamden Power Plant, Chicopee, MA
• Herbicide Spill, Chesterfield, MA
• Omega Corporation, Monson, MA
• Thermotech, Monson, MA
Case Study #1 - Century Brass
• Listed in 1984with DEP/EPA as a confirmed site.
• DEP/EP A Status: Priority site
- Short-term measures have been taken.
- Now in clean-up phase.
• Elapsed time: 6+ years
• Site Description:
- 72 acres with a 320,000 sq. ft. building.
- Only a few acres are contaminated.
• Contaminant: Metal Hydroxides (cadmium, zinc, copper, brass)
The interesting point about this case study is, first of all, it is in Connecticut.
Secondly, the remediation took awhile to begin because the clean-up
technology that the PRP wanted to use is new, and the Connecticut DEP had
no knowledge of its effectiveness. It took approximately four years to get DEP
approval for cleanup. In the meantime, a large recycling company was
interested in leasing the entire building. Because of the delays, the company
was not able to move in, and thus, moved its business elsewhere. The
recycling company waited one full year in the hopes that DEP would come
through for the PRP.
During our interview, the engineers cleaning up the site mentioned how
much more they enjoyed working in Massachusetts than Connecticut. They
said this is because Chapter 21E is more informative as to what the procedures
and requirements of site remediation are than is Connecticut's law.
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Case Study #2 - Hampden Power Plant, Chicopee, MA
-Listed in 1987 as a confirmed site.
- DEP Status: Priority site
- Short-term measures have been taken.
- Now in clean-up phase two.
- Elapsed time: 3+ years
- Site Description:
;,.22 acres with five acres buildable, 17 acres in floodplain.
- Only a few acres are contaminated.
- At the confluence of the Connecticut and Chicopee rivers.
• Contaminants: Underground oil, asbestos, and landfill materials.
Chicopee's case study is one of the more interesting studies we investigated
due to the amount of work already put into the site's prospects. The City of
Chicopee is the PRP, however, some of the site contamination is linked to an
adjacent parcel of land that once housed a drop forge industry. If the link can
be proven, the City will not have to bear the entire costs of site remediation.
There have been a number of ideas for converting the old power plant, but
the most exciting and well thought out is the development of
"AMAZONIA." Amazonia would be an indoor Amazonian rain forest that
would offer educational as well as research facilities. Much conceptual work
has been done on this idea, however, the building sits empty, constantly
deteriorating due to the problems of liability. The oil contamination at the
site is very visible, particularly during the wet seasons.
Case Study #3 - Town of Chesterfield. MA
=Listed in 1989 as a confirmed site.
- DEP Status: Priority site
- Short-term measures have been taken.
- Now in clean-up phase two.
• Elapsed time: 1+ years
• Site Description:
- Small area contaminated by a chemical spill from 55-gallon drum
behind highway department garage ..
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• Contaminants: Herbicide.
This study is unusual because the town is the PRP. A leakage of herbicide was
found behind the town's highway department garage. The DEP sent their
emergency response team to investigate and remove any chemicals causing
imminent danger. The town paid the initial bill, but was denied
reimbursement by the DEP. Due to the town's lack of funds, contaminated
soil still sits at the site. The town is in the process of obtaining the funding
necessary to dispose of the contaminated soil. The effects of this financial
burden will be felt throughout the town's budget for some time.
Case Study #4 - Omega Processing, Monson, MA
• Site confirmed and listed in 1989.
• DEP STATUS: Priority site
- Short-term measures have been taken.
- The property has been foreclosed.
• Elapsed time: 1 + year
• Site description: Chemical release in nearby brook.
• Contaminant: zinc cyanide
Omega Manufacturing was an electroplating company serving as a major
employer in the Monson area. Shortly after April of 1989 when an above
ground storage tank released hundreds of gallons of zinc cyanide into the
nearby Chicopee Brook, the plant dosed. This leak was so significant that the
town had to shut off one its water wells for fear of possible contamination.
Emergency measures were taken by the DEP. The company was in financial
trouble before this event occurred and this problem tipped the scales for
them. As a result, the company has declared bankruptcy and the building sits
empty.
Case Study #5 - Thermotech Plastics, Monson, MA
• Confirmed and listed in 1988 as a site.
• DEP Status: Phase Five
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• Elapsed time: 2+ years
• Site description: 12 acres, flat, near small brook.
• Contaminants: underground oil and cleaning solvents.
Thermotech is the one case that we studied that had a successful cleanup of its
contamination. The DEP contact person who handled this case is highly
valued for his ability to speed the process up and he did just that for this case.
Part of the diligence is due to the company as well. This is a forty-year old
company that is respected for both its support in community affairs as well as
for its standing as a valued business in the area. It is the second largest
employer in the town.
The problems encountered in this cleanup mostly surrounded the removal of
the contaminated soil from the business yard. It sat for two years before DEP
gave its consent for removal. The PRP believes this occurred due to some
bureaucratic technicalities. Although the site has been cleaned, the DEP will
not sign the final papers that state that the site has been cleaned to the DEP
standards. Nor has the DEP given the PRPs any idea concerning the amount
of time they have to continue to monitor the site.
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